states that private property shall not -be taken for public use, without just compensation.‖ Despite the apparent simplicity of the amendment, the issue remains controversial. For instance, the United States Supreme Court (USSC) has noted that it cannot establish a -set formula‖ for determining when a taking has occurred (Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 1978) . Controversies of interest to planners usually center on whether a regulation goes -too far‖ and what constitutes -public use.‖ 1 The literature on takings falls into two categories: legal and economic. Legal analyses include landmark pieces by Michelman (1967) , who emphasizes fairness, and Epstein (1985) , who takes a libertarian perspective. Economic analyses range from rational expectations theory (e.g, Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro 1984) to rule-based principles (e.g., Sax 1964; Miceli and Segerson 1994) . 2 These approaches share the underlying assumptions that landowners, judges, and planners, are rational decision makers and that market efficiency is, or should be, a critical consideration in decisions. 3 However, the assumption of perfect rationality has come under attack from a growing body of evidence in behavioral psychology. In response to the limitations of the rational model, this literature attempts to explain the law from a behavioral perspective (e.g., Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler 1998; Jolls and Sunstein 2006) . One component of this literature is the endowment effect.
The endowment effect-also known as the status-quo bias-is the tendency of people to hold on to property and rights that they have, implicitly placing more value on these properties and rights than if they never possessed them (Thaler 1980) . The endowment effect has been found to apply in many contexts, from a reluctance to trade possessions (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990; 1991) to a reluctance to change medical plans (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988) . The effect is evident in numerous studies that show that people are willing to accept (WTA) more for property they own than they are willing to pay (WTP) for the same property if they had not owned it (see Horowitz and McConnell 2002 for a summary of some of these studies). The endowment effect suggests that allocations of property by independent parties are likely to favor those already holding endowments (Korobkin 2003) , which include ownership, momentum toward ownership, or perceptions of ownership. Against this backdrop, I address my first question: Can the endowment effect provide insight into courts' decisions in takings cases?
I selected cases for review from a list of important takings cases maintained by the Community Rights Counsel (CRC), a nonprofit, public interest law firm based in Washington, DC. I do not review all the cases listed by the CRC, but instead concentrate on cases that are well known to planners, such as those involving regulations that affect development potential and condemnations for economic development. I exclude cases with complicated legal issues, such as compensation for temporary takings, except when they pertain to my arguments, and I do not claim that my conclusions extend to arcane cases.
I hypothesize that an examination of takings cases will reveal outcomes that are more likely to favor the holders of endowments. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that in wellknown takings cases that the party favored by endowments-whether governmental or privateis more likely to prevail in court, regardless of how the court arrives at its decision. My findings are consistent with previous findings on the importance of -first possession‖ and the well-known adage that -possession is nine-tenths of the law‖ (see, e.g., Bell and Parchomovsky 2005) . As noted by Kahneman (2011, 308 )-one of the founders of the field of behavioral economics 4 from which this article draws-this adage reflects the high moral status accorded to -possession‖ and it is actually reflected in many judicial opinions (Cohen and Knetsch 1992) . The findings of this article should therefore not be viewed as surprising, as they build on other research.
A few general caveats are warranted. First, because the law and its interpretation are not fixed, it is difficult to provide a universal theory of takings decisions. And, as is clear from many decisions, cases can be decided by slim majorities in courts. For these reasons, I do not claim that the endowment effect will predict the outcome of every case. Second, although I review a wide range of cases that are familiar to planners, additional research is needed to examine the robustness of my findings across an even wider variety of cases and contexts. Finally, additional research is needed to examine the size of the endowment effect as it relates to land, how demographic characteristics might influence the presence or magnitude of the effect, and circumstances under which the effect might be more pronounced or under which it might fade. I expand on these points in Section 6.
Implications for planning ethics and practice
Governments use eminent domain takings or regulations to achieve some objective.
Landowners can object in court to both types of government actions, whereupon governments must defend their actions. Because ownership-whether real, perceived, or by momentum-is important in establishing endowments that can be used to buttress arguments in court, and because governments can acquire endowments before court decisions are made, my findings lead to my second question: Can planners be ethical-in particular during an era that emphasizes deliberative processes-while pursuing strategic actions to acquire endowments in favor of their jurisdictions? To answer this question, I draw on literature that discusses the public interest in planning (see, e.g., Alexander 2002), the need for planners to move beyond ideal deliberation (see, e.g., Watson 2006), and -situational ethics‖ (see, e.g., Campbell 2006) . I conclude that planners can ethically pursue the public interest by strategically acquiring endowments so as to increase the chances of successfully defending their actions in court. This conclusion-based on current planning scholarship-is mostly normative; more research is needed to examine whether planners indeed behave as the ethics literature permits. I will also revisit this issue in Section 6.
The remainder of the article is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the USSC's positions on takings. Section 3 reviews the endowment effect. Section 4 examines well-known takings cases to demonstrate that decisions appear to be consistent with the endowment effect. Section 5 examines whether planners can ethically pursue the public interest by strategically acquiring property in order to increase the chances of successfully defending their actions in court. Section 6 suggests avenues for additional research. Section 7 presents my conclusions.
A summary of controversies surrounding regulatory and eminent domain takings
The USSC has had a hard time dealing with takings. For many decades, regulatory takings cases were guided by Justice Oliver Holmes' maxim in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon (260 U.S. 393, 1922) : -if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.‖ What constituted -too far‖ has been debated, but generally, as long as affected property still held some economic benefit to the owner, the regulation was not considered a taking. This approach was supplemented by Justice Brennan's three-part balancing test in Penn Central, which considered whether the regulations affected investment-backed expectations, involved invasion of property, and involved some historically recognized government activity. 
A primer on the endowment effect
Positive and normative interpretations of land use law assume perfectly rational decision makers. One of the underlying characteristics of a perfectly rational decision is that decreases in utility that arise from a loss equal increases in utility that arise from a same-sized gain (see, e.g., Posner 2003, Section 1.1, 6-5) . However, this assumption has faced increasing criticism because of widespread evidence that people treat losses and gains differently. In this model of decision making, the pain of a loss is greater than the pleasure of a same-sized gain (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) . For instance, in a widely cited experiment, students who received free coffee mugs required more money to part with the mugs than students without mugs were willing to pay for them (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990) . The first set of students treated the mugs as endowments that they acquired. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) refer to the phenomenon where people are unwilling to trade existing allocations as the status quo bias. A related concept is -framing.‖ Language that emphasizes loss produces stronger reactions than language that emphasizes gain, because forcing people to accept a loss is considered more unfair than simply withholding a potential gain (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991) .
Numerous studies have identified the endowment effect in a wide variety of situations for both tangible and intangible goods. Transactions involving tangible goods include exchanging lottery tickets for their nominal value (Knetsch and Sinden 1984) , exchanging coffee mugs for chocolate bars (Knetsch 1989) , and exchanging coffee mugs for cash (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990) . With regard to intangible goods, individuals were willing to pay (WTP) less for a decrease in risk than they were willing to accept (WTA) for an equivalent increase in risk (Dubourg, Jones-Lee, and Loomies 1994) . In another study, participants demanded more to give up a view than they were willing to pay to acquire it (Rowe, D'Arge, and Brookshire 1980) .
These differences between WTP and WTA have been widely observed in contingent valuation studies (see Horowitz and McConnell 2002 for many examples).
The endowment effect can be more pronounced when people believe they have worked hard or used their intelligence to obtain endowments (Rachlinski and Jourden 1998) . In a variation of the coffee-mug test, Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1994) gave mugs to students who earned the highest scores on an exam. Half of the recipients were told that they received the mugs because of their performance on the exam, while the other half were told that they received the mugs randomly. Those who were told that the mugs rewarded their performance demanded more money for them than those who were told they were randomly awarded the mugs. It is the nature of man's mind. A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it (477).
In Holmes's opinion, the adverse possessor had established ownership, otherwise known as an endowment, and now had more claim to the land than the owner of record.
Because the endowment effect is so prevalent, it is interesting to examine whether it plays a role in the takings decisions of U.S. courts, particularly the USSC. In particular, does the possession of endowments-real or perceived-by one party or another sway courts' decisions?
The endowment effect and courts' takings decisions

Regulatory takings and exactions
Land use regulations evolved to prevent nuisances (Prosser 1966) . While there are other rationales for regulations, the nuisance rationale is widely applied on the basis that no one should be allowed to inflict harms on society (Fischel 1985, 155) . On the other hand, regulations aimed at providing benefits sometimes do not survive the judicial process, on the basis that society should not benefit from restrictions imposed on a few (Fischel 1985, 155) . Over time, a number of other tests have also been applied by the courts to examine regulations, including whether the regulation leads to physical occupation, whether it deprives owners of all economically viable uses of property, the Penn Central balancing test, and the -nexus‖ and -rough proportionality‖ tests (the last two refer to exactions; see Wright and Gitelman 2000 144-146 ).
The endowment effect provides an explanation for many court decisions on regulations and exactions. In general, regulations or exactions that take away endowments-whether from private parties or governments-are not likely to withstand judicial review. Likewise, regulations or exactions that seek to provide gains to governments at the expense of landowners or to landowners at the expense of governments will also probably not survive a judicial process:
From a behavioral perspective, foregone gains count less than losses to governments or landowners (Cohen and Knetsch 1992) . By extension, if landowners cement their rights through plans or activities, regulations or exactions that take those rights away are less likely to prevail.
And if governments cement their rights through plans or activities, courts are more likely to favor their regulations or exactions.
The unequal weighting of losses and gains has implications for the framing of regulations. For instance, regulations framed in terms of preventing the loss of existing endowments will receive more deference from the courts than regulations framed in terms of providing gains. The following two subsections discuss some of these scenarios. prevented building on Lucas' lots. The fact that Lucas had already prepared plans was sufficient to establish that he had strong endowments before the new law was passed. In endorsing the power of the endowment, Justice Scalia noted in his decision that Lucas had plans and that the plans were precisely what he and other developers had been doing for almost two decades.
Endowments and land use regulations: I begin with
It is interesting to observe how interpretations of the 1987 law influenced decisions in lower courts. The law was viewed favorably when it was interpreted as preventing the loss of public endowments. For instance, relying on Mugler v. Kansas (123 U.S. 623, 1887), a majority of the Supreme Court of South Carolina (SCSC) determined that there was no taking because the law intended to prevent -public harm‖ (404 S.E. 2d, S. Carolina 899, 1991). But two dissenting judges read the law as intending to create gains by promoting tourism and visual amenities. Not surprisingly, these judges found a taking. In the majority view, potential public losses weighed heavily. In the minority view, potential public gains could not justify losses to Lucas.
Although Justice Scalia questioned the losses/gains (also referred to as harms/benefits) distinction, he preserved it with regard to -background principles‖ of nuisance and property.
Indeed, post Lucas, lower courts continue to give heavy weight to losses caused by nuisances.
Blumm and Ritchie (2005) Kendall, Dowling, and Schwartz 2000) . In the end Lucas has had unintended effects as courts invoke both traditional and increasingly expansive interpretations of nuisances-as an antecedent inquiry even before the substance of a takings argument is heard-to support government actions (Blumm and Ritchie 2005; Ruhl 2007 In San Diego Gas and Electric, the company planned to build a nuclear power plant. But as various courts noted, the plaintiff abandoned plans to build the plant after discovering an offshore fault that made the project risky. In the meantime, the land was rezoned and identified as potential open space as part of San Diego's open space plan. The City failed to raise a bond required for the purchase of the land, and the company sued for compensation, mandamus, and declaratory relief (Kmiec 1981 (Kmiec -1982 . However, two events hurt the company in court: It was forced to give up endowments due to natural circumstances, while the City acquired the same endowments by virtue of having prepared a plan.
Endowments and exactions:
Nollan is a classic case in which a condition was designed to provide benefits rather than prevent harms. The USSC did not uphold the condition. In Nollan, the plaintiff wanted to replace a small bungalow with a larger house. The authorities agreed to grant permission if Nollan allowed people the right to walk across the property to access the adjacent beach. From a behavioral perspective, the condition was designed to provide a benefit to the public; it was not intended to prevent a loss. This flaw reduced the likelihood that the courts would uphold the condition. From Nollan's perspective, it was helpful that he already possessed an endowment, which stemmed from leasing the property for many years. Indeed, Nollan appeared to understand the power of endowments-perceived or real-and he cemented his endowment by buying the property as the case made its way through the courts.
A hypothetical scenario sheds additional light on the power of endowments. Suppose beach-goers had a long history of traversing Nollan's property to get to the beach. Now, suppose
Nollan wished to build a house that would block their path. In this case, a condition that he must modify his plans and continue to provide access in exchange for a building permit would in all likelihood be upheld by the courts because the beach-goers had established a firm endowment in their favor. (This situation is similar to adverse possession, as discussed later.)
In Dolan, the USSC found that there was a nexus between the City of Tigard's regulations and conditions placed on Dolan for expanding her business. Specifically, the City required a land dedication along a creek that partially traversed Dolan's land in exchange for approving an expansion of the footprint of her business. The condition aimed to prevent losses due to flood damage and traffic congestion that would result from the expansion. Tigard also had a well-articulated plan to support its conditions on Dolan. The USSC overturned the conditions only because they were too onerous and lacked -rough proportionality‖ to the petitioner's plans.
Tigard may have had a better chance if it had pursued condemnation, backed up by its plan for the area. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist noted that -had the city simply required petitioner to dedicate a strip of land … a taking would have occurred.‖ Tigard would have had to compensate Dolan, but the court was likely to view Tigard's actions as routine use of its eminent domain power, supported by endowments acquired through its plans and the objective of preventing losses due to flooding and traffic congestion. Using plans as endowments levels the playing field: What matters are the development plans of private parties versus the regulatory plans of governments.
Eminent domain takings
Endowments and economic revitalization: Two controversial cases bookend the importance of establishing endowments to justify eminent domain takings: Berman v. Parker and Kelo v. City of New London. While both cases were ostensibly about the meaning of -public use,‖ the facts show that winning governments had established critical endowments when the cases were heard. In both instances, governments established endowments through a two-step process: first, preparing redevelopment plans and second, beginning to implement them.
In Berman, planners established endowments by preparing redevelopment plans for portions of Washington, DC, that they wished to revitalize. By virtue of its legislative powers over the District, Congress passed legislation that permitted the planning agency to adopt and execute a -comprehensive or general plan‖ including a -land use plan‖ (District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945). In his decision, Justice Douglas noted the comprehensiveness of the plan. By the time the case reached the courts, not only had the plan been completed but much of it had been implemented, firmly cementing endowments in the hands of the city.
In Kelo, the plaintiffs were at a disadvantage because the City had acquired considerable endowments by the time the case reached the USSC. Detailed plans were prepared for a research park, conference center, hotel, marinas, museum, and office and retail space. With City
Council's consent, the planning agency applied for and obtained permits from state agencies (Caves and Cullingworth 2009, 87-90) . The plaintiffs found themselves trying to wrest endowments from New London. As Justice Stevens notes the majority decision (citing Berman):
Given the comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption … it is appropriate for us … to resolve the challenges of the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire plan.
Therefore, Berman and Kelo should not be viewed only as debates over the meaning of public use. Rather, these cases demonstrate how governments can prevail in courts by preparing plans so as to establish endowments and then cementing those endowments by beginning to implement the plans.
My interpretation of Kelo complements that of Nadler and Diamond (2008) , who arguecorrectly I believe-that the controversy surrounding Kelo resulted because the public could relate to the plaintiffs' strong emotional attachment to their properties. However, the USSC was faced with the facts as presented. While the public correctly recognized endowments possessed by the plaintiffs, the public was unaware of the endowments acquired by the government. The USSC was required to weigh Kelo's endowments against the government's collection of endowments: plans, actual implementation activities, and momentum toward redevelopment. Midkiff is not about adverse possession, the lessons of adverse possession noted above shed light on this case: Occupation is important. Moreover, the occupiers were not squatters. They were living legally on the land and owned structures built on the land, thus giving them an even stronger endowment than squatters. While I acknowledge that legal arguments in court centered on the meaning of -public uses‖ and the oligopolistic power of landowners, and I do not extend my arguments to suggest that landlords risk losing land though routine leasing transactions, it is clear that occupation helped the lessees. To further demonstrate this point, it is important to note that the legislation did not permit sales to non-occupiers except under limited circumstances.
Summary of eminent domain cases:
First, preparing plans is critical to governments' successful defense of eminent domain takings. The plan is important not because it demonstrates good planning, public involvement, or some public-purpose criterion (contrary to the assertions of the head of the American Planning Association, Farmer 2005) . Rather, preparing the plan is the government's first step toward establishing endowments. Second, approvals help to cement endowments. Third, governments can gradually increase endowments and strengthen their case against holdouts by acquiring the property of willing sellers, as Berman and Kelo show. Fourth, physically occupying land also creates an endowment.
Can planners strategically acquire endowments so as to justify condemnation?
The previous discussions show that governments can prepare plans and create -facts on the ground‖ so as to establish and cement endowments. This increases governments' chances of successfully defending cases brought against them. On the other hand, it is in the interest of private parties to have their own plans and to prevent governments from preparing plans because plans themselves represent a significant shift in endowments in favor of governments. Indeed, it is in the interest of private parties to prevent planning processes-from the very beginning-that might lead to new regulations or condemnation. If Kelo et al. had created enough roadblocks during the participatory planning process, the final plan for redeveloping New London's waterfront might never have been formulated.
When governments are the ones attempting to acquire endowments, it raises ethical questions for planners. What are the ethical implications of planners acquiring endowments so as to justify new regulations or condemnations in court? This question is particularly relevant during a planning era that emphasizes deliberative processes. In addressing these issues, I draw on Kelo, which in many respects represents a -typical‖ situation, to illustrate the challenges that eminent domain takings pose for ethical planning practice, with particular regard to truth telling.
New London was a severely blighted community. A redevelopment plan was prepared through extensive public discussion and participation. Given the response of Kelo et al., let us assume-as is likely the case in similar situations-that many residents objected to the plan.
Armed with the knowledge that acquiring endowments by preparing a plan and acquiring land will make it difficult for Kelo et al. to win in court, how should planners respond?
In cases such as Kelo, both the consensus-building and implementation stages pose quandaries for planners. During the consensus-building phase, there are challenges to principles of communicative rationality, which require planners to speak truthfully. In this phase, could a planner say to a community that includes potential holdouts, -Do not worry about holdouts going to court: If we prepare a plan and I strategically acquire land, it will be difficult for them to win.‖ Clearly, such a statement-while truthful-would doom any consensus-building attempts, and planners wishing to pursue condemnation to promote redevelopment would be wise not to reveal this strategy. 8 During the implementation phase, could a planner rapidly purchase the properties of willing sellers so as to acquire critical endowments before holdouts get to court?
To address these issues, I turn to a discussion of the public interest because it appears to be the only avenue that allows planners to behave strategically while still employing elements of communicative rationality stress the multiplicity of interests (Forester 1989; Healey 1996) , Campbell and Fainstein (2003, 13) conclude that these scholars are actually -renewing‖ a focus on the public interest, but in ways that differ from previous technocratic or advocacy approaches.
Campbell and Fainstein conclude that throughout the evolution of planning theory, -the central task of planners‖ has always been -serving the public interest‖; it remains the -leitmotiv‖ that holds planning theory together (Campbell and Fainstein 2003, 13) . Who determines what is in the public interest? While previous generations of officials reserved this role for themselves, in a pure form of communicative planning, the public interest should emerge through deliberation that is deontological -through and through‖ (Campbell and Marshall 2002, 180) . However, Campbell and Marshall (2002) , Alexander (2002 ), Pløger (2004 , and Watson (2006) argue that dialogical forms of deliberation cannot be relied on to articulate the public interest when there are strong divisions of interests, as in the case of eminent domain takings. These arguments are echoed by Huxley (2000) and Flyvbjerg (1998) . Campbell and Marshall (2002) conclude that communicative rationality is incapable of defining the public interest and that planning-and by extension planners-are critical in articulating it. Although not discussing the role of planners in defining the public interest, Watson (2006) advocates alternatives to deliberation, arguing that alternatives can lead to better outcomes. And even well-known advocates of communicative rationality acknowledge that things have to start somewhere. For example, Innes and Booher (2010, 92) note that planners can be -leaders and sponsors‖ by identifying problems and/or taking the initiative to find solutions. 9 Fortunately, the planning literature, including the literature on communicative planning, provides guidance for current-day planners on how to articulate the public interest. At the heart of this guidance is the elevation of the public interest to the level of planners' ethics (e.g., Brooks 2002, Chs. 5 and 9; Ploger 2004) . To be sure, scholars who blend communicative rationality with ethics in carving a role for planners to determine the public interest build on the work of other planning ethicists who precede the rise of deliberative practice, such as Bolan (1983) and Howe and Kaufman (1979) ; 10 this highlights the fact that planners' ethics have been critical in determining the public interest for a long time.
Such ethics operate within specific contexts. Planners must-and are encouraged tomake ethical choices about what is better for the community. Campbell and Marshall (1999, 476) argue that when planners make choices, the reality of -the socio-economic and institutional contexts‖ within which they find themselves should take precedence over a procedural emphasis on deliberation. Further, drawing on O'Neill (2000) and Young (1990 ), Campbell (2006 discusses how ethical judgment allows planners to move from universal ethical principles to situated contexts. One of Campbell's examples involves what do to with a piece of greenspace:
preserve it for environmental protection or use it to provide affordable housing? These planning problems are -situated‖ and -must be handled by some form of institution probably under the aegis of the state‖ (Campbell and Marshall 2006, 246) .
Planners face similar conditions when contemplating actions that might lead to takings.
From Berman to Kelo and Lucas, planners made choices that translated ethical principles to situated contexts. Of course, planners could sometimes get it wrong, in that supposedly universal principles, like those accepted at the time of Berman, are now considered inappropriate.
Nonetheless, there is ample historical evidence to show that planners have adapted general ethical values to suit certain situations (see, e.g., Howe 1992; 1994 for examples). In particular, the implied ethical principle behind takings, at least in the post-Berman era, has been to promote economic revitalization and environmental goals at the expense of property owners.
Planners' leeway in shaping the public interest does not mean that they should not use deliberative processes, nor does it mean that planners are the only arbiters of the public interest.
As Campbell and Marshall (2002) point out, planners' interpretation of the public interest can and should be vetted by a participatory process. But, as Young (2000) notes, such processes should be guided by a desire to achieve good outcomes. The point at which public processes should give way to the public interest will depend on planners' personally defined values (Brooks 2002, 76-77) , as discussed in many examples provided by Howe (1992; 1994) .
Ultimately, electoral politics and the vicissitudes of electoral democracy will determine whether planners-as agents of elected officials-used their judgment appropriately (Brooks 2002, Chapter 12) and got it right (Campbell and Marshall 2002 (Chang 2010) . This suggests some recognition of the endowment effect, but whether this goes far enough is still an empirical question. 8. In addition to studies that examine the psychological premium that should be paid to landowners in takings cases, other studies could examine whether landowners overestimate the negative emotional impacts of losing property or whether the endowment effect fades rapidly with time (Blumenthal 2009 ).
In particular, what non-pecuniary actions can planners take to ameliorate the pain of losing one's home?
Conclusions
This article introduced the concept of the endowment effect, an empirical observation rooted in behavioral psychology that people value losses more than they value gains. Because takings involve the loss of property, it is interesting to examine whether the endowment effect might be reflected in judicial decisions involving controversial takings cases. My research leads me to conclude that the endowment effect helps explain controversial takings decisions. I
acknowledge that the arguments presented in this article may not always hold. Takings cases are too complicated to assert that a single theory will always predict how the courts will rule.
Nonetheless, the endowment effect appears to have considerable predictive power.
The following four salient findings about endowments and takings resulted from this research: 1) Notwithstanding Lucas, regulations that are written to emphasize losses to society rather than gains are more likely to survive judicial review; 2) Endowments can include comprehensive plans, development plans, investments, permits, and laws; 3) both governments and private parties can acquire endowments such as plans, investments, and permits in attempts to sway courts in their favor; and 4) occupying land creates a strong endowment. My findings should not be viewed as surprising as they build on an emerging body of research.
The high value placed on deliberation raises questions about whether planners can ethically behave strategically to acquire endowments so that their actions can survive judicial review. Many planning theorists have articulated the continuing importance of the public interest and the role of planners in achieving it. Situational ethics, which guides the day-to-day decisions of planners, permits planners to use their judgment to depart from ideal deliberation in pursuit of the public interest. Planners may, for example, use their ethical judgment to create endowments by buying the properties of willing sellers while some landowners holdout in an eminent domain case, engaging in a race to prepare plans for environmentally sensitive land before private developers can do so, or otherwise seeking to influence legislative processes.
There is a need for further research to see if my findings about the endowment effect hold across a wider set of land use cases. I also suggest research intended to highlight the presence of the endowment effect among citizens, understand how this effect might vary in different circumstances, help planners understand the public's discomfort with takings, and shed light on planners' perceptions of their own ethics.
